A UN Peace Force?

William R. Frye

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A UN PEACE FORCE?

BY WILLIAM R. FRYE

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this pamphlet summarizes a study prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The study was inspired by two beliefs: first, that the UN's success in using a small "police" force in the Middle East last autumn might open new avenues for strengthening the United Nations; second, that it was necessary to explore means to prevent local hostilities between small nations from engulfing the superpowers and engaging their superweapons.

When Mr. William R. Frye was asked to undertake the study, his instructions were to face up to "difficulties and limitations." He was free to reach any conclusion to which his inquiry led him, including the conclusion that a permanent "peace force" would not be desirable or practical at this time. Instead, he has concluded that a modest step forward can be taken.

I hope that the study and this pamphlet, for the form and content of which Mr. Frye takes the responsibility, will contribute to public consideration of the important issues, problems, and possibilities involved in creating a UN peace force.

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Joseph E. Johnson

President
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

the public affairs committee

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A UN PEACE FORCE?

BY WILLIAM R. FRYE

William R. Frye, UN correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor *since 1950, is one of our leading authorities on the United Nations. He is author of* Disarmament: Arms into Ploughshares? *and co-author of* The United States' Stake in the UN: Problems of Charter Review. . . . *The illustrations are by Emery Kelen.*

TWO SIMULTANEOUS crises—in Hungary and the Middle East—arose to challenge the United Nations in the fall of 1956. In one case the world organization relied solely on moral force; and despite world public opinion, it was not able to prevent a catastrophe in Hungary. In Egypt, the UN added to its moral force a wholly new instrument for peacemaking—an international police force. The force was little more than a symbol, a tangible manifestation, of the UN's moral might. But a war was stopped and a period of relative calm was achieved.

Many other factors, of course, contributed to the UN's relative success in Egypt and its failure in Hungary. But UNEF, the United Nations Emergency Force, played an important part. Many thoughtful people have urged that the UN obtain such a force as a permanent part of its peacemaking machinery. This pamphlet explores the question of how it could be done.

The United Nations Emergency Force was an accident of history. It was created in such haste that even its parents scarcely recognized it. It was sent out to do a man's work while still an infant, with few tools and fewer instructions. At home, the parents have quarreled over who should feed it and clothe it and over how long they should permit it to live.

Yet, somehow, UNEF is a success. It has won the hearts of nearly everyone, from Lt. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt to Senator William F. Knowland of California and from Foreign Minister Malik Firoz Khan Noon of Pakistan to Marshal Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia. In part, this is because it has managed, despite all handicaps, to do its job; in part, it is because so many people have felt for so long that its parents—the United Nations—really should have had children.

the force emerges

UNEF was born, in a legal sense, at 7 p.m. on Wednesday, November 7, 1956, when Rudecindo Ortega of Chile, President of the UN General Assembly, announced: "Sixty-four in favor, none opposed, twelve abstentions. The resolution is adopted." Eight days later, on Thursday, November 15, at 9:35 a.m., the first UN troops, 45 Danes, landed at Abu Suweir airfield ten miles west of Ismailia, Egypt. It was one of the fastest diplomatic-military "crash" operations in history. And perhaps the most astonishing part of it is that the first of the men could have been there in three days—on November 10—if Egypt had been willing to let them in.

Putting a United Nations police force together from scratch in eight days is like visiting the Louvre in 15 minutes. It is better than not doing it at all—but that is about all that can be said for it. No one in his right mind would do it that way if he could help it.

Another time, if the UN is confronted with a crisis like that of November, 1956, the very least that would be useful would be a guidebook, a distillation of knowledge and experience. In addition, the world organization would speak with more authority and act with more practical effect if it had at its fingertips a permanent police force, ready to do at least the limited kind of noncombatant duties that were assigned to UNEF. Had such a force been available for use in Egypt, it is possible that the British-French invasion could have been forestalled altogether.

THE LONG ROAD

THE idea of an international peace force is so logical, on the face of it, that it is a major mystery why—in all human history—there have been so few serious attempts to establish such a force. Just as a city or a state requires police to curb lawbreakers and protect the law-abiding, so the world community should have force at its disposal and law to govern its application. The difficulty is that on a comparatively small scale, men often recognize that their interests are alike and are willing to trust a central authority to promote them; whereas on a world scale, rivalries, animosities, language and color barriers, and other differences obscure the common interest and prevent the creation of a central authority. Without such an authority, the use of force for common purposes is extremely difficult to organize. In a sense, the world in the mid-20th century has barely reached the stage of development of the American Wild West, when frontiersmen took the law into their own hands, or organized into posses to round up horse thieves and cattle rustlers.

Because it never has been politically possible to establish a permanent international police force, however, it does not necessarily follow that it never will be possible, or even that it is not now possible. There were many, including at first the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who thought the United Nations Emergency

Force, now stationed in Egypt, was beyond reach. It was not. The UN now in fact possesses, at least temporarily, a force to maintain peace. One step has been taken along a road mankind has sought to tread for centuries.

public opinion prepared

There are indications that public opinion in the United States would be prepared to take still a further step. In the spring of 1957, after UNEF had been on the job for about six months, the American Institute of Public Opinion (the Gallup poll) asked a representative cross-section of Americans the question: *"Do you think the UN should have its own permanent armed forces, including troops from the United States, which it could use to enforce UN decisions—or would that be giving too much power to the UN?"*

The results, published May 7, 1957, were as follows:

Yes, should have	53%
No, should not	23%
Can't say	24%

In Congress, two Senators—John J. Sparkman (D) of Alabama and Ralph E. Flanders (R) of Vermont—and two Representatives —Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr. (R) of New Jersey and A.S.J. Carnahan (D) of Missouri—have introduced similar resolutions endorsing the idea. Within the United Nations General Assembly, there appears to be a large nucleus of opinion which is favorable—at least in principle—to the establishment of a force.

the problems

What exactly is meant, however, when one refers to a "permanent police force"? Should it be able to meet aggression? If so, aggression of what size? Should the force be made up of national contingents, contributed by member states (a "quota force"), or should it consist of individual volunteers directly recruited (an "international force")? Who should command it? Should it exist on paper, in the form of pledges by member states, or should it be "in being," at an internationally operated base or bases? If the latter, where would the base or bases be located? All these questions, and many more, would have to be answered by anyone planning a permanent police force.

a large force?

Suppose it were decided that the force should be designed to meet aggression—aggression of any size, by whomever committed. Suppose its function, in short, was to guarantee peace in the world, and to impose settlements of disputes before they become wars. Such a force obviously would have to have more power than any single country or group of countries—more than the Soviet Union and its satellites, more than the NATO countries combined. Unless the great powers could be persuaded to disarm, which seems extremely unlikely, this would mean an international peace force costing tens of billions of dollars a year. Obviously this would be impossible on top of present defense budgets.

Perhaps, then, it would be decided that the international police force should be large enough to meet any aggression except that committed by a great power. Say the planners hit upon a force of 500,000 men—surely a minimum—stationed at strategic points around the world, and supplied through an elaborate logistical network which provided food, clothing, vehicles, spare parts, etc. The United States has found that it costs roughly $6,000 per man per year (not including research and development of weapons and retirement costs) to keep such a force in being. By drastically lowering standards of pay, housing, insurance, family allowances, etc., this might perhaps be cut in half. Even so—even if that were feasible—it would still cost the UN $1,500,000,000 a year to maintain a force of 500,000 men. The present budget of the UN is roughly $50,000,000 a year, or one-thirtieth that amount.

Divide the size of the force by ten; predicate a mere 50,000 men —scarcely enough to interfere with a serious attack by a state the size of Israel—and the cost would still be out of reach, for all practical purposes, unless the United States wished to carry most of it. It would be a good investment in American security to use $100,000,000 or $150,000,000 a year for this purpose, especially if the United States could be sure the force would be used wisely on all occasions. But the only way to guarantee this—that is, the only way to guarantee that the United States would think the decisions wise—would be to give the United States full control over the force, either indirectly through control of its logistics, or directly by weighted voting in the UN General Assembly. The latter

would require an amendment to the Charter impossible to obtain, and the former probably would not be reliable enough to satisfy Congress the money was being safely spent. It certainly would not be enough to satisfy the United States Department of Defense, which has fought against a UN police force for years.

Countries which do not now possess atomic weapons can be prevented from building them secretly in significant numbers if there is thoroughgoing inspection. If it could be guaranteed that the UN police force would never be attacked by atomic weapons, the possession of such weapons by the UN might give it adequate power on a financial shoestring. (It would have maximum "bang for a buck.") But if the aggressor did not have atomic weapons, would the UN really be prepared to use such weapons against him? What of destruction to cities and civilians in the territory of the victim state, where the aggressor's armies had penetrated? A whole range of difficult moral problems would be raised. Can anyone seriously conceive of the UN General Assembly announcing to, say, Israel that unless its armies were withdrawn from Egypt by a certain date, Tel Aviv or Jerusalem would be atom-bombed by a UN air force? A peace organization depending on weapons of mass destruction would be such a drastic departure as to be almost a contradiction in terms.

—or a small mobile force?

If these alternatives are to be ruled out, and the world nevertheless wishes to establish a permanent UN police force, what remains? A small, mobile force of 5,000 or 50,000 men with light to medium conventional weapons—that is to say, a permanent force on the model of UNEF, ranging in size from that of the present UNEF (6,000 men) to one which would be about eight times as large. Such a force would not, by itself, be able to stand up to an aggressor very long, even given the maximum size. It would not be able to invade hostile territory against organized resistance; therefore it would not be able to enforce UN decisions, in the literal sense. If the world wants an enforcement agency, it will have to face up to the problems of a larger, more heavily armed force.

What a police force of 5,000 to 50,000 men could do would be to prevent border crossings by small, unorganized, or irregular

forces (such as Arab feyadeen); act as a strip of insulation, or a tranquilizer, for hostile and fearful states—coming between them and preventing unplanned clashes; patrol cease-fires and armistices, and by its very availability for the task, help diplomats to obtain the cease-fires; perhaps enforce arms embargoes or other interruptions of commerce or communications; and do a host of miscellaneous jobs. (UNEF, among other things, helped to break up a narcotics ring in Sinai. A Bedouin tried to persuade a UN officer to buy hashish; the officer pretended to agree, but paid in marked money and later lured the leaders of the ring into a desert rendezvous which was a trap. The leaders were all captured, together with an opium cache valued at $500,000.)

Such a police force could be used as an international "trip wire" or "plate-glass window." It could be placed in the path of an aggressor together with a warning that if it were attacked, member states would come to its rescue. If these promises of reinforcement were seriously intended, and clearly made, an aggressor would have to reckon not merely with the force immediately confronting him —force which he certainly would be able to overcome—but with the power which it represented. States which were serious in their intention to deter aggression could use this means of doing so. Less effective, but perhaps adequate in some circumstances, would be a decision to put the force in the path of an aggressor without any clear indication of the consequences if it were attacked. The aggressor at least would think twice before risking the possible consequences, even though these consequences might consist solely of the moral condemnation of the world community. A small, mobile UN police force would also be of use in the twilight zone between peace and full-scale organized aggression. It could have played an important part, for example, in the Greek civil war (1946-1949), helping seal off the Greek borders to bands of rebels based in neighboring states. Such a force might have halted the war.

volunteers or a quota force?

This alternative type of force, then, is worth detailed study. Suppose, at the outset, that the target was set at a modest level; a lightly armed infantry brigade of about 7,000 men. The troops could be directly recruited, as individual volunteers; or they could be bor-

rowed from UN member states; or there could be a directly-recruited headquarters establishment, forming the nucleus, and troops from member states could make up the body of the force. There are so many practical difficulties in the way of a truly international army of individual volunteers that it would be unwise to attempt to form the whole force in this manner. It would cost the UN a lot more than a quota force; all the burden of salaries, pensions, hospitalization, equipment, etc., would fall on the world organization, instead of being shared with contributing states. It might be difficult to screen out undesirable personnel. There would be legal problems involving possible loss of citizenship for some of the individuals; court martial standards would have to be overhauled (some crimes are serious in one army and trivial in another); language difficulties and other problems of coordination would have to be solved. States would have a less immediate interest in paying for, and rescuing from attack, a force with which they did not feel as closely associated as they would one which included units of their own armed forces. A prospective host state might object to some of the personnel on grounds of nationality, religion, etc.; and the objections might have to be honored, however improper they would be in principle.

recruits for headquarters unit?

Many of these problems, indeed most, could eventually be surmounted, given a willingness by governments to take on the job and a bit of enthusiasm from public opinion to spur them on. At first, however, it would seem best to limit the directly-recruited portion of the force to the headquarters unit, if indeed, it should include volunteers at all.

Such a force, ideally, should be assembled at a base, given training as a unit, and kept in readiness for use on short notice. It should have, or plan to obtain, a small air arm consisting of transport and reconnaissance planes, and perhaps helicopters; it should have armored reconnaissance vehicles and communications equipment; it might usefully have a few small naval vessels for patrolling water boundaries; for psychological reasons, it might have some paratroops. All this would require a considerable logistical "tail," that is, supply pipeline. Standardization of equipment would be desirable.

Troop contributions from member states could be stationed at the base for periods from six months to two years; thereafter, they could be replaced by contributions from other states. Training would consist primarily of instruction and practice in sealing off borders, in patrol and surveillance, communications, riot control, and combat against small, irregular hostile forces. Troops which returned to their country of origin after training would have a valuable store of knowledge and experience which could be tapped by considering them a "ready reserve" for a period of at least one or two years.

The choice of a commander should be made by the General Assembly. He and the Secretary-General could build a staff of officers for the force headquarters by drawing on UNEF personnel, by borrowing members of the UN's truce-supervisory teams in Palestine and Kashmir, and by direct recruitment.

In addition to the headquarters of the force, there should be a small staff of officers in New York, at UN headquarters, advising the Secretary-General and making long-range plans. And the Assembly of course would also wish to establish a subordinate body of its own, similar to the Peace Observation Commission set up in the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950, or the UNEF Advisory Committee set up by the General Assembly to work with the Secretary-General in UNEF.

setting up a base

One of the principal problems in setting up such a force would be to obtain a base or bases. At the outset, one base unquestionably would be all the world organization could afford; indeed, if it had to be built from scratch, even one would probably be more than the UN could swing. An adequate base for 7,000 men, including barracks, training grounds, airfield, depots, hospital, and recreation and communication facilities, would be likely to cost in the vicinity of $65,000,000. As a practical matter, the UN almost certainly would have to rent or buy, on advantageous terms, a base already in existence, and this would mean finding a member state which was willing to dispose of one of its own. The United States has a number of suitable ones; Britain and France have a few; but there are not many other countries with facilities which would be ade-

quate and which would be likely to be available. In all probability, the ability of the UN to obtain a base would depend upon the willingness of the United States to supply one at considerably less than the original cost.

Maintenance and servicing of such a base would be a major item. It undoubtedly would run to $1,000,000 a year. Countries contributing troops to the UN Force would have to supply the original equipment; otherwise, to equip a force of about 7,000 men with light arms and vehicles, and other standard equipment would cost from $12,000,000 to $20,000,000. If, say, twenty-one modern jet transport planes were included for deployment, the cost would skyrocket; it would go up by $120,000,000. Logistics are difficult and costly, even for infantry, let alone for aircraft and naval vessels. Labor, spare parts, and fuel for aircraft are especially expensive items. It would cost $13,000,000 a year to maintain the twenty-one transport planes, assuming they were in the air an average of one hour a day (a minimum of economical upkeep). Twenty-two small reconnaisance planes and twenty-eight helicopters, estimated to be approximately the requirement for a force of 7,000 men, would cost nearly $3,000,000 to buy and about $2,000 an hour to maintain and operate. Arrangements with commercial airlines to charter aircraft in an emergency, or with member states to contribute them, might be necessary in view of these costs, despite the obvious disadvantages —notably the fact that the needed planes might be in use and hence unavailable on short notice.

Cutting all the corners possible—arranging to charter the aircraft, assuming no cost at all to the UN for the base or the original equipment, depending on contributing states to carry the same expenses they assumed in the UNEF operation—it might be possible to keep the annual budget for a 7,000-man force down to $25,000,000 when not in action. This is probably an optimistic estimate; and if the force were committed, the figure certainly would increase.

It is easy to argue that the world community should be willing to undertake an expense which is, by comparison with many national budgets, very small. The cost of a single Forrestal-class aircraft carrier, for example, is $200,000,000. The United States recently abandoned XC-99, a troop and cargo-carrying aircraft, which cost $15,000,000 to build and $1,100 an hour, or some $9,600,000 a year, to maintain and operate. Logically, the various nation's share of a UN police force should be considered a good investment—a great deal of additional security for a comparatively small cost. But the unfortunate fact is that there is almost no chance whatever of the UN General Assembly spending $25,000,000 a year merely to keep a police force in being, without any immediate task for it to perform. There has been great reluctance to spend a similar sum—approximately $27,700,000—for the first thirteen months of UNEF, and UNEF is performing a useful task in a critical area. Every effort is being made to persuade the United States to assume a large share of this cost, and the United States is resisting. The Senate and the House draft resolutions endorsing a permanent police force both speak of paying for it out of the UN's regular budget. This would mean limiting the United States' share to one-third or less. If that is the most Congress will contribute, there is little or no hope of establishing a permanent force that costs $25,000,000 a year or more because the other states are not willing to shoulder the other two-thirds. An item of $25,000,000 would add 50 per cent to the UN's budget.

the problem of command

Then there would be knotty problems connected with command of the force. The General Assembly was prepared to give Secretary-General Hammarskjold wide discretion with UNEF because it had great confidence in him and because the emergency demanded

unusual measures. But would it be equally willing to make him, or some other Secretary-General, in effect, the commander-in-chief of a permanent army without severe restrictions? It would be understood, of course, that the force would not be sent into operation by anyone but the Security Council or General Assembly, and that when in operation, the Council or a committee of the Assembly would be kept constantly abreast of day-to-day developments. But what exactly would be the division of responsibility between the Secretary-General and such a committee? Where would the Secretary-General's discretion end and the committee's authority begin?

All these considerations argue against a force permanently in being. None of the problems is necessarily insoluble, given an impelling desire to solve it and a conviction that a standing police force is essential to peace. But such desire and such conviction do not today exist on a sufficent scale. The momentum from UNEF is considerable, but not that great. It is not enough to carry governments past the obstacles involved. Public support for measures to strengthen the UN's peacemaking power should be harnessed to something more modest, and for that reason, more easily attainable at this time.

FIRST STEPS

IF the ideal solution—a force in being, stationed at a strategic base, with planes, ships, and vehicles to take it wherever it is needed—is not now feasible, must it necessarily follow that nothing can be done? Must a permanent UN police force become, like peace with justice, the rule of law, self-determination, and the virtues of the Assembly President, something to which lip service is paid in the UN's annual "general debate," and thereafter forgotten until the following year?

A case could be made for the argument that in an emergency, a police force could be set up *ad hoc*, as it was in November, 1956. Despite all the mistakes and wasted motion which inevitably accompany improvisation, the first 45 men of UNEF were delivered in Capodichino, Italy (the UN's staging area near Naples) by November 10, three days after passage of the final enabling resolution. By November 12, there were 150; and by November 14, the

number was 649. By November 14, there were also 111 tons of equipment, and the buildup of both men and equipment was faster thereafter. If the UN had had a few transport planes available from small countries, so that it would have been politically feasible to locate the staging area in Egypt, there would have been no reason why the same number of men and the same equipment could not have been at the scene of action in the same length of time, Egypt willing.

This might or might not be fast enough in another emergency. It was good enough in Egypt; it probably would not have been fast enough in Hungary. But there is no need to trust wholly to improvisation a second time. Without spending more than a few hundred thousand dollars, mostly for salaries, the General Assembly could set up on paper a permanent peace force. That is to say, the Assembly could make all the necessary plans to call a peace force quickly into being. States could set aside troops for use as UN units, and a staff of officers at UN headquarters could co-ordinate the pledges. If without advance planning UN troops could be mobilized in days, with careful planning it could be done in hours. A pledged force might be almost as readily available as one in being. Indeed, under some circumstances, it could even be more readily available. Troops earmarked by Yugoslavia, for example, and held in readiness near Belgrade, might get to a crisis area in the Middle East faster than UN troops stationed in New York. Such a force would be more flexible, more easily adapted to circumstances, than one in being.

careful preparation necessary

The advance preparation, however, would have to be careful and thorough. UNEF experience has taught many invaluable lessons in this respect. In the early days of the Egyptian crisis, it would have been extremely useful to have known, for example, where armored reconnaisance troops could be found; which countries had large transport aircraft capable of ferrying not only men but vehicles across the Mediterranean Sea; where staging areas like Capodichino could be had on short notice; which Asian countries (known to be particularly acceptable to Egypt) would be prepared to contribute infantry; where engineers, ordnance men, medics, etc. could be found, and how many would be needed; how large an over-

all force would be required to do the job; and a hundred other important things.

With such information at hand, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and his staff could have planned a force that would have been well-balanced — from both the political and military points of view—before contributing countries were approached or made public offers, committing their prestige. It also would have been possible to sound out Egypt privately at an earlier stage and find out what troops would be acceptable. Such preparation would have smoothed over many other practical and political problems, and could probably have cut in half the time required to get UNEF on the ground in Egypt.

Admittedly, it is not a simple matter to get advance promises of cooperation from governments. Few, if any, are willing to pledge themselves to send their men anywhere the UN General Assembly may ask, at any time, for any purpose the Assembly may consider wise, even if the men are not likely to have to fight. Countries making such a commitment might find themselves, when the time came, faced with the alternatives of reneging on their promise or taking action they considered against their own national interest or that of their friends. In 1954, for example, friends of the United States would not have wished to help insulate the frontiers of Guatemala until after the revolutionary armies based in neighboring Honduras had succeeded in overthrowing the leftist-inclined regime of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. The world community has not yet reached the point (despite high-sounding phrases in the UN Charter) where all use of force, for whatever purpose, is regarded as necessarily bad. It may well be that in this respect the conscience of the world has not yet awakened to the atomic age; but it is a fact, nevertheless, and until that point is reached, states will not be prepared to pledge themselves to help check any and all use of force under any conditions.

A substantial number of governments, however, might be willing

to promise that if they agreed with an Assembly recommendation dispatching a police force, they would contribute a certain number of troops for certain kinds of duties, and that meanwhile they would hold them in readiness for such a purpose. A headquarters staff of officers, believing that the UN might need certain kinds of manpower not yet pledged, could so inform states and suggest that they earmark it for UN use; and with the necessary reservations, some member states undoubtedly would be prepared to do so. It is true that an effort to persuade governments to set aside forces for UN use failed in the early 1950's; but what was then involved was establishment of a reservoir of fighting forces to resist an aggression like that in Korea. A similar effort today, on the understanding that the troops would be used for patrol, observation, and police duties of the UNEF type, not for fighting, might get different results.

sharing the costs

It would be easier to get pledges from many countries if they knew, in advance, what their gesture of international-mindedness was going to cost them in cash. The specific nature and dimensions of the crisis, of course, could not be forecast, but the division of financial responsibility between the UN and the contributing country could. The precedents being set by UNEF undoubtedly will be a guide, but it would be very helpful if a set of principles could be outlined and endorsed by the General Assembly.

Another related subject which it would be useful to clarify, if possible, would be the formula for division among member countries of the UN's share of the costs. These costs should be shared by everyone on the same scale as the regular UN budget; but for any operation the size of UNEF or larger, the United States and a few other countries may well have to bear more than their normal share, because many small and underdeveloped countries simply could not afford to add substantially to their present UN contribution. The only real question would be: How much more would the richer countries have to carry?

Still another area in which detailed advance planning could be made is logistics. It should not be necessary another time for vital rations to depend so largely on the accidental proximity of American

supply depots, or for other supplies to be improvised or done without. Those organizing the force should either have food and uniforms on hand, in rented depots, or should know where these things could be found and transported quickly. It would be useful too, to know — for example — that Indian troops do not like Egyptian rice, and that Indonesians do not have winter clothing as part of their regular equipment. An Indonesian offer of troops for UNEF was put aside and actually forgotten for more than a week when Jakarta said its men were not equipped for winter in the desert. UN headquarters did not know where wool uniforms of suitable design could be found on short notice. A certain amount of elementary strategic and tactical planning also would be desirable, even though there might be no thought of a police force having to fight against organized opposition. Non-secret maps and data on climatic conditions, for example, could come in handy.

There should also be advance provision for a headquarters and commander. It was a happy accident in November, 1956, that there was available, in the immediate crisis area, a commander for UNEF with a ready-made staff. The next crisis might not be so happily located. A small pool of trained personnel ready to be flown to a danger spot immediately — in hours, rather than days — might also serve a highly useful purpose. A very few might be enough. In the early hours following the cease-fire in Egypt, ten officers from General Burns's Palestine Truce Supervision Organization were rushed to Port Said, with Egypt's permission, to patrol no-man's-land and help preserve what was then a precarious truce. Tempers were at a white heat, and a single incident of the wrong kind could have revived full-scale fighting. The physical presence of the ten observers, with UN insignia, flags, uniforms, etc., had a remarkable psychological effect, according to eye-witnesses, calming the atmosphere and giving promise of fuller UN intervention to come. The men also helped keep the enemy forces physically apart.

the problem of morale

UNEF has proved that there can be a severe problem of morale with men whose duties are routine and who are stationed far from normal entertainment. The glamor of a UN armband can wear off very quickly for a man who has to patrol a barren desert in 100-degree heat and sandstorms, and has nothing to look forward to when he is off duty except poker and shooting craps on a blanket in his tent. Some of the UNEF troops found beaches; a few soccer balls and chess sets occupied others; but it was nowhere near enough. Officers discovered that the men were fraternizing with Israeli WACs across the demarcation line, a practice which could have undesirable political as well as other implications. A leave center ultimately was set up in Beirut, and men rotated to it once every six months. Professional show people from the United States and elsewhere were enlisted, on a volunteer basis, to come and entertain. But it was all begun much too long after the men arrived; the Golden Gate Quartet, first on the scene, was not there

until the spring of 1957, and it was late summer before the first sultry redhead, Abbe Lane (Mrs. Xavier Cugat) set out. It simply had not occurred to UN headquarters that redheads and baseball bats were essential parts of a peace force operation.

In addition to areas in which it is clear that advance planning would be desirable, there are other fields in which it might be better not to outline the course of action too closely, but to leave the General Assembly — or Security Council — ample room for decision in the light of the circumstances. It might or might not be useful to try to formulate in advance the rules that should govern dealings between the world community on the one hand and contributing states on the other.

the rights of the "host"

As for the "host" state, what rights does it possess beyond the elementary right of deciding whether or not the force should be admitted to its territory? Could or should this right ever be waived or modified, and if so how, and by whom? To what extent should the host state expect to participate in the selection of troops to be admitted? in determining where they will be stationed, and the duties they will perform? in deciding when and under what conditions they should withdraw? These are all highly controversial and, indeed, politically explosive issues. The very act of raising them might rend the delicate fabric of cooperation with Egypt. What about the "host" which is not generally recognized as a state — for example, North Korea or Red China? Would dealings with it constitute recognition? Must its consent be given equal weight? How much difference is there when a territory is not an undisputed portion of the host state, e.g., where control is provisional or the very object of the dispute (as in Kashmir)?

It is hard to envisage the General Assembly reaching an agreed consensus in advance of a specific set of circumstances. Indeed, it might not even be desirable to do so; the greater the obscurity, it could be argued, the greater the flexibility.

There are dangers, however, in avoiding decisions of this kind. If there were no accepted plans and blueprints to serve as a guide, the world community's freedom to act in a crisis would depend entirely on the amount of military and political pressure brought

to bear on the "host," as it did in the case of Egypt. If such were the case, there would be a powerful motive for aggrieved states, or states believing themselves aggrieved, to bring pressure to bear on their adversary. In some circumstances, the aggrieved state might be tempted to commit, or threaten, aggression in order to extract from the adversary consent to UN peacemaking. Moreover, the aggrieved state would have few reasons to halt its action and turn over the job of peacemaking to the world community (as Britain and France did in November 1956) until the desired consent was forthcoming. An additional incentive for the use of force might thus have been created.

Pioneering in the field of consent is made especially difficult by the impossibility of predicting future conditions. A victim state might command such universal sympathy that no one would wish to bypass its consent (though this seems unlikely in a world where few issues, if any, are wholly black and white in every spectator's eyes). The victim might have been reduced to desperation before the world community could act, or choose to act, and in this case, too, no problem of consent would arise. But what of a case where both the victim and the aggressor were considered equally to blame for the state of affairs which had led to the aggression? or where the victim was considered more at fault, before the actual outbreak of the violence, than the aggressor? Would it be equitable to condition all peacemaking action on the consent of the victim, and thus enable him to use the world community to enhance his relative bargaining position? Would this, or would it not, be too great a penalty to exact from the aggressor for the use of force under conditions of great provocation? The best line of approach might be to attempt to set desirable precedents with UNEF, and let them be the pattern for the future. This is, in fact, what Hammarskjold and his aides, within the limits in which they have had to work, have tried to do.

A PROGRAM FOR ACTION

The General Assembly could set in motion the machinery for a permanent UN peace force in a resolution which, among other things, would:

Note the outstanding contribution which the United Nations Emergency Force has made to peace and security in the Middle East, and express gratitude to those who have assisted or are assisting in that operation;

Point out that UNEF is a temporary measure designed to serve a limited purpose;

Recognize the widespread desire that similar facilities to keep the peace be made permanently available to the United Nations for use in other emergencies;

Request member states, other than the permanent members of the Security Council, to designate elements of their armed forces for use, with the consent of the states concerned, in a United Nations Peace Force which would do observation, patrol, and other similar duties in response to a request by the Security Council or General Assembly for assistance in maintaining and strengthening peace and security;

Direct the Secretary-General to establish, within the Secretariat, a permanent staff of officers, headed by an Adviser to the Secretary-General, whose task would be:

(1) to plan the organization, transportation, supply, and command of such a Peace Force in advance of its use;

(2) to consult with the states concerned on the equipment, training, and state of readiness of designated personnel;

(3) to make such other plans as would also facilitate the effective employment of the Force on short notice; and

(4) to undertake, under the direction of the Secretary-General, the supervision of an Observer Corps provided for in the following paragraph;

Establish, as part of the Secretariat, an Observer Corps consisting of:

(1) officers like those serving the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, and

(2) enlisted personnel similar to the headquarters guard force;

Request the Secretary-General to recruit a limited number of such officers and enlisted personnel for duty with the Peace Force and to hold them in readiness for instant use at the call of the Security Council or General Assembly;

Request the Peace Observation Commission (perhaps with different membership), or a committee specially created, working in conjunction with the Secretary-General and the permanent staff of officers, to study such further steps as would facilitate the usefulness and availability of the United Nations Peace Force, and report to the next session of the Assembly;

Request the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and other organs of the United Nations to assist the Peace Observation Commission (or special committee) in the performance of this task.

a peace force, not a fighting force

One element of similarity between such a resolution and the Uniting for Peace resolution adopted in 1950 is immediately apparent. Both call upon member states to earmark elements of their national armed forces for use as a United Nations unit or units. But whereas the purpose in 1950 was to help restore peace through "collective measures including . . . the use of armed force when necessary" — that is, to meet aggression head on — the purpose today would be to keep a peace which already existed but which, without the UN force, would be dangerously unstable.

Contingents earmarked for UN use would not expect to have to fight, certainly not against the organized forces of a state. Their job would be to prevent fighting. If they did any shooting in anger, it would be against individual marauders or small bands. Their power would lie less in their rifles than in their armbands; they would represent the moral authority of the United Nations. Their very presence in a danger zone would help to prevent trouble. Any state which attacked them and either captured them or wiped them out would take upon itself an overwhelming burden of world condemnation. No one, of course, could *guarantee* that their tour of duty would be pacific, but this would be the intention.

It would be well to keep this distinction between a fighting force and a peace force clearly before world opinion and before gov-

ernments. Not only would a clear picture help to encourage troop contributions, but it would guard against false hopes and consequent disillusionment. Twice before — in 1945 when the UN was created and in 1950 — the world was led to think the United Nations was being made into an organ of genuine collective security, only to find that governments were not yet ready, in fact, to create such an organ. It would be disastrous to appear to try a third time, and fail.

This is one principal reason for issuing a new appeal for troops, specifying that the troops requested would do "observation, patrol, and other similar duty" in "maintaining and strengthening" (not "restoring") peace and security.

Choice of the Peace Observation Commission, rather than some other group, to work out details and thus become a kind of godfather to the force, would also help to clarify the role envisaged for it. The very name of the Peace Observation Commission suggests one of the duties of the force. To be sure, a permanent United Nations peace force would not be merely a uniformed subcommission of the P.O.C., because it would do more than merely observe and report. But it would be so similar in its overall objective that the mental image would be worth cultivating.

before a crisis

How would such a peace force fit into UN peaceful-settlement work? First, before a crisis arose, a subcommittee of the Peace Observation Commission could be sent to the scene. Observation and reporting in an area of tension might be sufficient to prevent an outbreak of fighting, either by clearing up genuine misunderstandings or by denying to a potential aggressor the cloak of confusion and falsehood under which he had planned to act.

If this were not sufficient, dispatch of the peace force by the Assembly or Security Council could be the next step, and might add the dimension required. It would not be necessary to wait until after the event to send UN troops. Had a force been sent to the Egyptian-Israeli armistice line prior to October 29, 1956, for example, it probably would have inhibited the invasion of Sinai, whereas the presence of observers (the UN Truce Supervision Organization) did not.

if fighting breaks out

If despite all precautions, or before adequate precautions were taken, fighting broke out, the problem would become one of restoring — rather than preserving — peace and security. It would then, so long as the fighting continued, be beyond the scope of the peace force envisaged in this booklet. Should the world community wish to suppress the aggression by force of arms, it could always act under the Uniting for Peace resolution. That resolution remains valid, and could be implemented on comparatively short notice. Much of the logistical and other planning done for a non-fighting force might be quickly adapted to the broader purpose.

Once a cease-fire has been obtained — through diplomacy, political or economic pressure, or military action — the pattern would revert to that of UNEF in Egypt. Taking a leaf from the UNEF experience, the first step after the firing stopped might well be the immediate dispatch of a few men to patrol no-man's land and try to calm trigger-happy front-line troops. These troubleshooters might have to be available without any delay whatsoever. This is the reason for asking the Secretary-General to recruit and hold in readiness a limited number of additional military observers and guards as an Observer Corps within (or on loan from governments to) the UN Secretariat. One hundred would probably be enough; even fifty might do. It is their presence, not their numbers, which would be important.

peacetime duties

The principal problem would be to give them useful employment when they were not on duty in a crisis. In the case of the observers, this could be solved by rotating them with existing UN armistice missions — the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (which could use extra personnel)and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (i.e., Kashmir). A portion of the whole observer team would always be kept at headquarters. When there, the men could be assigned to the permanent staff of officers whose job it was to do detailed planning for the force. They would stand ready either to be flown to a crisis area themselves or to replace men in the field who were

so dispatched. The guard personnel (enlisted men, as distinct from officers) could be added to the staff of Secretariat guards, who now number between 125 and 150. With a total of 175 or 200, some 25 or 50 could always be spared for emergency duty in a crisis area. It would be useful to have a pool of perhaps 200 to draw from, since at any given time, some nationalities and some religions might not be welcome in a host state. One could not send Jews to Egypt, or Egyptians to Israel, for example, despite the fact that in pure theory, all men employed in the Secretariat are impartial international civil servants.

exclude the big five?

Exclusion of the Big Five — the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China — from a permanent UN peace force would be wise, at least at the outset. When great powers take part in an operation such as this, they dominate it; the smaller countries are window dressing, make believe. The special interests of the great powers in many trouble zones would limit their freedom of action. To the extent that the great powers gear their armed forces to atomic weapons, these armed forces would become less suitable for a peace patrol. Obtaining the consent of a host state to the admission of great-power troops might involve special problems; some host states, for example, might have deep-seated fears of "imperialism." And there would be other factors complicating the preliminary negotiations, such as prestige and political "balancing."

Moreover, from the point of view of the United States, it would be desirable to keep the Soviet Union out of many areas where the peace force might operate, and the only convenient way of excluding the Soviet Union would be to bar all five. Were the United States to contribute troops in a crisis the Soviets probably would insist on doing so too. And it would be very awkward for the Secretary-General or the control organ to refuse such a demand. Soviet satellites could volunteer for a small-power force, but there would not be as much pressure to accept their offers. Czechoslovakia and Romania offered troops in the case of UNEF, but they were not used. If, for some reason, it were considered expedient — as in Indo-China — to let Communists take part in

supervising an armistice, the damage to the operating effectiveness of the force would be less severe if they were from nations other than the Soviet Union.

Exclusion of United States troops might cost the force a certain amount of support from American public opinion. Congress might more willingly appropriate funds if GI's were included — though the corresponding inclusion of Russians would more than counteract any such advantage. If the force were given a difficult task, such as patrolling the Formosa Straits, it would be useful to have American firepower, though no doubt the Canadians and some others could do the job if they were willing. American logistical support would be virtually essential in most cases when the forces went into action — at least, it would until an elaborate UN supply network were established; and that might be such a costly undertaking that it would never be attempted. But American logistical support could be had without American troops. It has been available for UNEF without troops on the spot, and could be made available again.

It would be important to make clear, in setting up a permanent force, that there was no intention of making UNEF itself permanent, as such. This is why an enabling resolution should point out that UNEF is a "temporary measure designed to serve a limited purpose," and that the facilities being made permanently available to the UN were for use in "other emergencies." During the winter of 1956-7, the United States delegation considered proposing a permanent force, but eventually dropped the project. The decision not to press ahead was motivated in part by fear that Egypt — jumping to the conclusion UNEF was being made a permanent army of occupation would order the force off her territory. Much of that danger has passed, now that UNEF has benefited Egypt and hence proved popular with the Egyptian Government and people; but in all likelihood there would still be a sharp reaction if Cairo were to get the impression UNEF was to stay, indefinitely, on her side of the line. Some contributing countries, too, would resist any suggestion, however unintended, that their commitment was being made permanent, especially if it came to appear that the principal function of UNEF was to protect Colonel Nasser. There need be no misunderstandings, however; there would be no re-

lationship between the UNEF and the permanent force except that the latter would draw on the experience of the former and perhaps take over some of the personnel of General Burns's headquarters. General Burns himself would be an excellent choice for the Secretary-General's military adviser, as soon as he could be spared from his job in Palestine.

The task of planning the development of the force could be done by the Peace Observation Commission, or by some committee specially set up for the purpose. One reason for selecting the P.O.C. would be to revive the almost-forgotten bit of peace machinery and transform it into an active, useful part of the UN picture. When it was established, in the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the P.O.C. was popularly hailed as the future "watchdog" of peace in the world, the "eyes and ears" of the UN. But except for a very minor role in Greece it has never been used. Given the new duty of planning for a peace force, the Commission might well take a new lease on life. The possibility that the force would be needed in a trouble zone might become apparent during its planning work; if so, it could recommend to the General Assembly or the Security Council that a P.O.C. subcommission be sent to the area to explore the need. In time, the P.O.C. might be given authority to send out subcommissions on its own initiative — always assuming, of course, the consent of the state to which the subcommission was to be sent.

By the terms of the basic resolution, the Security Council or General Assembly would have ultimate control over a peace force in action. But who would exercise day-to-day operating control in such a case? This is one question the P.O.C. could study. In the case of UNEF, the task was given to the Secretary-General, with loose supervision by an advisory committee. Without knowing who the Secretary-General might be in some future crisis, the Commission might not wish to commit itself too firmly to this arrangement. Indeed, the Commission's final recommendation to the

Assembly might be that it was the better part of wisdom not to decide this point until an emergency arose. When the time came, a control organ could be chosen and its relationship with the Secretary-General could be defined.

prospect of success

Is such a peace force feasible at this time? Or would the idea start like a skyrocket, only to fizzle out the way the 1950 effort did? Would a substantial number of countries earmark troops, or would they simply reply, when asked, that they approved of the idea in principle, and would be happy to consider contributing if the need arose? In the latter case, the UN would not be much further ahead than it was before the Egyptian crisis. No fewer than twenty-four countries, however, offered troops for UNEF; some, in fact, were eager to serve and not a little put out when they were not permitted to do so. The opportunity was considered a distinction; it was a domestic political asset to many governments. Logically, a number of these same countries, and others which were discouraged from volunteering for UNEF, should be prepared to cooperate in setting up a permanent force.

It should be made perfectly clear that the country earmarking troops would have full freedom not to serve, if it wished, when the occasion arose. The "consent of the states concerned" would be necessary, and this would mean their consent as well as that of the host state. There would be no need of evasive action and heavy qualifications in the original response. Once governments and public opinion fully realized the importance of intelligent, informed advance planning—planning that could not be done without specific earmarking of at least specific kinds of troops, if not the troops themselves—there should be a satisfactory response.

Indeed, designation as a UN unit could become a coveted honor within the contributing nation's armed forces, an honor to be competed for and won through outstanding performance in the field and in training camp. There would have to be incentives—special items of uniform, perhaps additional pay, perhaps the prospect of joint maneuvers at some climatically attractive site, perhaps a trip to UN headquarters with time off in New York City.

Other incentives also could be devised. The contributing government would benefit from such competition. It would raise the level of performance throughout the service.

Should this plan not appeal to a government for any reason, an alternative would be to accept volunteers for a special United Nations unit or units on the understanding that volunteers would serve for a given length of time in the national armed forces. It has been proved repeatedly that there are thousands of idealistic young people eager to help promote world peace. They have volunteered by the scores of thousands, for example, for labor in work camps designed to raise the standard of living in other lands. There is every reason to think that troops could be obtained. Lester B. Pearson, former Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, is one who believes so, and he undoubtedly knows the UN as well as any diplomat alive.

"Even if governments are unable to give the United Nations a 'fighting' force ready and organized to serve it on the decision of the Security Council," he wrote in the April 1957 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, "they should be willing to earmark smaller forces for the more limited duty of securing a cease-fire already agreed upon by the belligerents. We might in this way be able to construct a half-way house at the crossroads of war, and utilize an intermediate technique between merely passing resolutions and actually fighting."

If the experience of UNEF is not built upon, he said, "we shall only go back again to the situation in which we found ourselves last November [1956] when everything had to be improvised, when there was no precedent for making units available, no administrative and financial procedure, and no organization to which the Secretary-General could turn in the task given him by the Assembly of putting a United Nations force into a dangerous and delicate situation.

"We improvised successfully then. We cannot reasonably expect the same degree of success a second time."

A guide for discussion purposes to accompany this pamphlet, based on the book by William R. Frye, A United Nations Peace Force, *may be obtained by writing to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (United Nations Plaza at 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y.), attention Miss Colville.*

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